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Abstract 
The paper discusses a perennial dichotomy of the human place in the universe related to its 
physical embodiment and, at the same time, to its epistemological infinitude. In different words, 
on the one hand humanity is physically incommensurable with the universe, on the other hand the 
whole universe is defined and articulated by man. It is claimed that modern cosmology is 
functioning in the conditions of the paradox of human subjectivity, which has been known since 
ancient Greek philosophy. The presence of this paradox explicates the essence of the human 
condition. Any attempt to represent the universe in the phenomenality of objects, that as devoid 
of the human insight, leads to the diminution of personhood and reduction of humanity to the 
artefacts of the physical and biological.  However, even if cosmology advocates such a vision of 
the universe, personhood is not eliminated but is “present in absence”. Cosmology becomes an 
apophatic tool in explication of personhood as centre of  disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe. Correspondingly cosmology exhibits itself as a characteristic middle between the 
natural and human sciences.   
 
Key words: embodiment, humanity, intentionality, life-world, microcosm, nature, 
paradox of subjectivity, personhood, space-time, universe. 
 
Резюме 
В статье обсуждается вечная философская проблема двойственности положения человека 
во вселенной: с одной стороны человек, будучи воплощенным физически, конечен, с 
другой стороны, эпистемологически он неограничен. Другими словами, физически человек 
несоизмерим со вселенной, эпистемологически же он охватывает всю вселенную. 
Современная космология функционирует в условиях этого парадокса, известного со 
времен классической греческой философии,  и, таким образом,  эксплицирует сущность 
амбивалентного человеческого состояния.  Любая попытка представить вселенную как 
целое в феноменальности объектов, то есть как лишенную присутствия человеческого 
взгляда на нее, приводит к отрицанию личностного существования и сведения феномена 
человека  к незначительному физическому и биологическому артефакту. Однако, даже 
если космология ратует за такое видение вселенной, личность не исчезает из картины 
вселенной, но становится «присутствующей в отсутствии»: личность, как центр раскрытия 
и манифестации вселенной, эксплицируется в космологии апофатически. Соответственно 
космология  позиционирует себя познавательная активность, принадлежащая как области 
естественных, так и области гуманитарных наук.    
 
Ключевые слова: воплощение, вселенная, жизненный мир, интенциональность, 
личность, микрокосм, парадокс субъективности, природа, пространство-время.  
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We know that man is closely allied with nature not only in the sense 
that he is part of it…but also, and even above all, in the sense that 
each impulse of his soul finds a profound an wholly natural 
substructure in the world, and in that way reveals to us a primordial 
quality of the structure of the universe.  
                                              E. Minkowski, “Prose and Poetry”, p. 244 





Introduction: Cosmology in rubrics of 
Embodiment  and Historicity 
 
If cosmology, as a product of human 
activity,  pretends to deal with the 
universe in its totality, assuming this 
totality in the natural attitude of mind as 
omni-spatiality and omni-temporality, it 
must exercise bravery in combination 
with a healthy scepticism of making 
pronouncements about the whole, by 
being only a tiny part of this whole. In 
spite of the fact that the philosophical 
mind, that is, a critical mind, accounts 
for its own incomprehensibility of this 
totality on the grounds of the  finitude of 
humanity, this finitude was at the same 
time counterweighted by its alleged 
infinitude. For example, Kant, when 
discussing the analytic of the sublime, 
took it as quintessence of human 
existence and asserted that as creatures 
dependent on the senses we are finite, 
while as creatures of reason we are 
capable of absolute freedom and 
independence. The universe can be 
paralleled with  the sublime according to 
Kant’s definition that “the sublime is 
that in comparison with which 
everything is small”. Then, in his logic, 
nothing which can be an object of the 
senses can be considered as the sublime. 
However, and here Kant gives credit to 
humanity as capable of extending the 
realm of the senses: it is because “there 
is in our imagination a striving towards 
infinite progress, and in our reason a 
claim for absolute totality, regarded as 
the real idea, therefore this very 
inadequateness for that idea in our 
faculty for estimating the magnitude of 
things of the sense excites in us the 
feeling of the supersensible faculty” 
(Kant 1951 [§25], p.88). It is this 
supersensible faculty that makes it 
possible to produce the idea of the 
universe and thus to pretend for being 
commensurable with it. However, as was 
pointed out by J.-F. Lyotard, it is not in 
all cases that the sublime can be 
processed and integrated in the 
framework of experience. It can provide 
such an excess of sensibility and 
imagination that the finite human being 
cannot cope with it, and the origin of this 
Lyotard finds in the traumatic beginning  
of human life which in turn entails a 
radical, that is unmasterable finiteness of 
human beings (and thus,  logically, their 
unmasterable incommensurability with 
the universe) (Lyotard 1997, p.243).  
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 Practicing cosmologists, however, 
dare to speculate about the universe as a 
whole postulate the contrary, that is that 
there is an intrinsic commensurability 
between their embodied intellectual 
abilities and the grand-total of being 
which this intellect attempts to 
encompass. Here they follow Pascal, 
who in his Pensées  anticipated a simple 
truth that in spite of the fact that the 
universe in its deep foundations and 
origin is hidden from the human grasp, 
to know the nature  of things humanity 
must assume its proportion to nature: “It 
is a strange thing that [men] want to 
understand the beginnings of things and 
from that to progress towards the 
knowledge of everything: for that is a 
presumption as infinite as the object of 
their exploration. We surely cannot 
make plans like that without an infinite 
presumption – or  an infinite capacity – 
like nature itself” (Pascal 1959, p. 73). 
For most of working cosmologists this 
commensurability is taken as a premise, 
for otherwise their work could not even 
begin. In the  history of philosophy of 
mathematics one can find an interesting 
trend of relating the finitude of human 
beings as creators of mathematics with 
its very origin (Becker 1938). 
Mathematics is seen as the mastery of 
the infinite  so  that only  finite beings 
can make sense of the problem of the 
infinite; only them  want to master it and 
thereby find themselves “confronted by 
the abyss of the unsurveyable, 
innumerable, and undeniable” (Ströker 
1965, p. 306).  
 
 The commensurability between 
humanity and the universe, assessed by 
the philosophers of existence amounts to 
that “…the physicist continues to think 
of himself as an Absolute Mind before 
the pure object and to count also as 
truths in themselves the very statements 
that express the interdependence of the 
whole of the observable with a situated 
and incarnate physicist” (Merleau-Ponty 
1968), p.15). Thus cosmologists exhibit 
that mode of thinking, which can be 
characterised as an anonymous and 
collective rational core, striped of 
particular historical and personal 
incarnate situatedness  in the world. 
Anonymous and collective nature of 
scientific thinking follows from the 
requirement that scientific knowledge 
and the method must be “public”, so that 
the results of science can be presented to 
a wide audience and this ultimately 
establishes science as linked with 
episteme (as being different to personal 
opinions.) However the requirement of 
“publicness” of science allows one to 
pose a question of its subject or subjects.  
It is clear that in order to achieve a 
universal communication and public 
structure of knowledge one must strip 
off all historically contingent and 
empirically individual characteristics of  
subjects making them indifferent. In this 
case the truth established by one will be 
the same for another (Ibid., pp.16-16). In 
other words, the commensurability 
between historical embodied 
consciousness and the totality of the 
universe is achieved by means of a 
radical reduction of all contingent 
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properties of thinking (as related to 
situation in history and science 
pertaining to it) and equating the scope 
of consciousness’ receptacle to the 
totality of all articulated facts about the 
universe. Here the classical Cartesian 
constitution of the subject of knowledge 
is implied, namely the deprivation of this 
subject of any contingent characteristics 
makes this subject a-temporal and a-
historical, attributing to its thinking 
capacity the qualities of absolute 
knowledge. The subject itself becomes 
universal and eternal so that it is here 
where the optimism of cosmologists lies: 
the knowledge of the universe is possible 
because of the universal and absolute 
nature of the subject of science. 
However, as it was pointed by Kant in 
the context of the notion of the world,  
this optimism can be justified only as 
related to “thinking of” or “imagining 
of” the universe, not knowing it. A 
careful consideration of the Cartesian 
constitution of the subject of knowledge, 
historically corrigible in view of Kant’s 
stance on it, tells us that this subject can 
only be achieved as a sort of 
eschatological reality, as an ideal which 
plays a regulative role with respect to 
particular scientific research. Then this 
implies that the representation of the 
universe as a whole as commensurable 
to scientific consciousness also 
represents an ideal, an asymptotic 
guideline which drives research which 
will never exhaust this ideal in every 
particular stage of it.1 Correspondingly, 
                                                
1 See an interesting discussion  on the 
eschatological sense of the ideal of rationality in 
when cosmological consciousness 
forgets about a simple truth that its own 
facticity is related to embodiment in the 
physical which, as science itself 
demonstrates, is not immutable and 
hence contingent. Thus there arises a 
general problem of reconciling historical 
contingency of forms of embodied 
consciousness with the alleged apodictic 
nature of its judgements about the 
universe.  
 
Since cosmology pretends to deal 
with knowledge of the totality of the 
universe  it is legitimate to pose a 
question about the human capacity for 
such knowledge. This in turn implies an 
enquiry into the human condition in 
general. One of the basic assumptions of  
the European intellectual tradition (in its 
deviation from the characteristically pre-
modern Christian stance on 
anthropology) is that human nature, or 
human phenomenon,  is part of the 
encompassing reality (that is, nature). 
The seeming efficacy of the methods of 
physics, for example, is transferred to 
anthropology and creates another 
conviction  that one can exhaustively 
comprehend the meaning of human 
existence by methods of the natural 
sciences. What this means is that nature 
at large as well as human nature, as part 
of it, was implicitly conceived of as 
objects present-to-consciousness. In this 
case the reality of nature, as the 
collection of things and objects given to 
this anonymously present consciousness 
                                                                 
science in (Goutner, 2008). 
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in their sheer facticity, had to be 
apprehended by science and knowledge 
through revealing the essential, universal 
and common characteristics of these 
objects.  Since human nature was 
considered as part of nature at large, it 
acquired the features of things (in the 
phenomenality of objects) within nature 
whose knowledge meant to know 
essential and shared physical and 
biological characteristics of human 
beings which aim to define this very 
human nature although with a total 
disregard of personhood as the otherness 
to nature entailing existential uniqueness.  
 
 The major difficulty with this 
naturalistic stance is that it predicates 
human nature as being part of and 
determined by nature at large while this 
very nature can be attained only from 
within its particular  fragment, that is, 
human nature. It  becomes clear that a  
philosophical  ideal for radical enquiry 
about the knowledge of nature (or being) 
as devoid of  any presuppositions about  
what has been sought can hardly be 
achieved because philosophy is created 
by human beings who cannot be 
removed from the central and initial 
point of any enquiry about nature (or 
being).  Thus, it is understood that the 
question of nature and human beings in 
nature in particular, is most intimately 
connected with the question of how this 
being can be attained. Since it seems 
evident that the comprehension of being 
can only be reached from within the 
experience of what human beings 
themselves are, the attainment of nature 
(being) is always linked to that particular 
being which humans are. Thus if we 
refer to the universe as being a “part” or  
“mode” of being in general, one must 
admit that the being of the universe  is 
always disclosed through the being of 
human beings.     
 
 Speaking differently,  a concrete 
human existence (as incarnate existence 
in situation) becomes the root and source 
of access to the universe. But what is so 
particular about human existence? What 
does this existence mean? Existential 
phenomenology assigns to the term 
“existence” a special meaning by 
affirming, for example, that this “term” 
serves not to express that something 
actually belongs to the realm of  existing 
realities, but to indicate that  mode of 
being which is proper to man and 
precisely constitutes him as human be-
ing. Existence in this sense is only 
intrinsic to human beings, and it is this 
existence  that makes them a 
fundamentally special mode of being. 
Thus the existence of the universe in this 
view can only be understood as the 
transferral of the mode of human 
existence to what we call the universe. In 
a different language, the universe is 
manifested or subsisting through 
articulation by human beings.2   
                                                
2 One can employ a theological terminology by 
saying that the universe is enhypostasized by 
human being. The Greek terms enhypostatic or 
enhypostasis, which were  introduced in 
theology by Leontius of Byzantium in the 
context of Christological discussions of 6 - 7 
centuries,  have meaning according to A Patristic 
Greek Lexicon as “being, existing in an 
hypostasis or Person”, “subsistent in, inherent”. 
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 Existential phenomenology 
considers human existence as a 
primordial phenomenon, as an initial fact 
of any further philosophising about the 
world, which cannot be fully reduced to 
                                                                 
Florovsky  refers to the terms used by Leontius 
by saying that  enhypostasis points towards 
something which is not self-contingent, but has 
its being in the other and is not contemplated as 
it is in itself. Enhypostasis is the reality in the 
other hypostasis. (See, for example, (Florovsky 
1987, pp. 191-203). An  example,  which  
illustrates what the existence in a hypostasis or 
person means,  can be borrowed from a sphere of 
theological anthropology which   asserts   that 
“man is hypostasis [personality] of the cosmos, 
its conscious and personal self-expression; it is 
he who gives meaning to things and who has to 
transfigure them. For the universe, man is its 
hope to receive grace and to be united with God”  
(Gregorios,1987, p. 83). The universe as the 
expressed and articulated existence is possible 
only in human hypostasis, that is it acquires 
some qualities of existence if it is reflected in the 
personality of humanity. Using the words of 
Maximus the Confessor, every intellection about 
the universe inheres as a quality in an 
apprehending being (compare with his, Two 
Hundred Texts on Theology and the Incarnate 
Dispensation of the Son of God , 2.3). The 
universe thus acquires  qualitative existence in 
the being who apprehends it. Prestige in order to 
illustrate how the apprehending knowledge 
becomes hypostatic existence  refers to Clement 
of Alexandria (Stromata, 4:22, 136:4), in order 
to articulate the point that speaking of 
knowledge,  “apprehension extends by means of 
study into permanent apprehension; and 
permanent apprehension, by becoming, through 
continuous fusion, the substance of the knower 
and perpetual contemplation, remains a living 
hypostasis. This appears to mean that knowledge 
becomes so bound up with the being of the 
knowing subject, as to constitute a permanent 
entity” (Prestige 1955, p.176). The link between 
the universe as articulated existence and the 
apprehending being is not ontological, but rather 
hypostatic or personal. A Patristic theologian 
would say that existence of the universe as the 
articulated existence is hypostatic existence, that 
is the universe is enhypostatic. 
something else or demonstrated by 
reference to  “the outside” of this 
existence. Theology in its “explanation” 
of  the mystery of human existence 
asserts creaturehood of humanity, as the 
radical otherness to God serving at the 
same time the basis for the unity and 
hence objectivity of all hypostatic 
(personal) humanity.  The existence of a 
particular human person is not 
something which  is inherent or latently 
present in the world, but represents an 
event which  is initiated  in   creation but 
which is not of creation. Christian 
anthropology argues that human 
subjectivity is inconceivable without  
embodiment, so that human existence is 
constituted by the unity of the body and 
soul. However, this unity is not an 
elementary fact of being-in-the-world, 
which can be easily taken as an initial 
point. In  a Christian  perspective the 
unity of body and soul is hypostatic, so 
that genuine existence is rooted in the 
mystery of  the human  hypostasis which 
transcends the world. This existence  has 
its ultimate source in the transcendent 
Divine, in whom  human soul and body 
inhere in their  hypostatic unity. 
Christian anthropology asserts that  
human beings are constituted not only 
through their “natural” predisposition to 
transcend their own subjectivity in the 
world,  but they also have  some ability 
and will to transcend the very 
relationship between their subjectivity 
and the world, that is to transcend being-
in-the-world3; this makes it possible to 
                                                
3 This is terminology from (Heidegger 1998, p. 
78). 
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articulate nature in general (and human 
nature in particular) not only through its 
relationship to human intentional 
consciousness, but to position nature  
with respect to God. In this logic it is 
through this other-worldly dimension 
that humanity can have ability to 
articulate the world as a whole by 
effectively positioning itself outside the 
world;  human consciousness is 
commensurable with the entirety of the 
universe due to the similarity of their 
foundations in the other of the world. In 
this sense a universe of a human being 
would be always existentially co-present 
and unique to this being by the fact of 
creation, although its context as related 
to living experience would become 
completely contingent and probably 
incommunicable to the other. This would 
create a problem of articulation of the 
universe as totality within history, as 
communion in community of human 
beings. Christian theology responds to 
this by asserting cosmic history as part 
of the history of salvation (Clément 1976) 
thus exercising a move similar to that of 
existential phenomenology. 
 
It is clear that the views of 
existential phenomenology, which in its 
methods mimics that which has been 
asserted  in theology, are stated as 
radically different in comparison with 
the scientific natural attitude which 
treats humanity as thing among other 
things. According to existential 
phenomenology all particular 
manifestations and all meanings of 
things in the world can only be 
understood and receive their foundation 
as correlates of the human hypostatic 
subjectivity whose mystery itself is 
never exhausted by means the of 
physical.4 This implies that any scientific 
activity, including cosmology, cannot 
discard the tacit presence of human 
existence in their assertions of reality.  
Any attempt to speculate about the 
universe as if it is done in the name of 
anonymous and impersonal absolute 
consciousness becomes no more than a 
fallacious ambition of the human reason 
to produce syllogistic insights on the 
nature of the universe by disregarding 
the transcendental conditions  of  its 
presence in the world.  This entails that 
cosmology with respect to its claims 
about the universe, cannot be 
consistently understood without taking 
into account  the nature of human beings 
who create cosmology. As it was 
expressed elsewhere: “Man and the 
universe are like two parts of the same 
book which can be understood only by 
means of  one another” (Dondeyne 1958, 
p. 10), (Köhler 2011, p. 37). 
 
Subjectivity and Incarnate Existence 
 
Existential phenomenology and 
existential tradition in general object to 
that stance of modern science which 
positions humanity as part of the 
outward reality (nature, world, universe) 
as if this reality existed independently of 
the  constitution of this reality through   
                                                
4 In this sense phenomenology reproduces a 
Christian stance on anthropology as being 
apophatic because it tells one exactly what 
human person is not (see (Clément 2000, p. 30).   
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human insight.  Rather than beginning 
with nature and then seeing human life 
as its part, it argues for the reversal of 
procedure, that is seeing  the human 
reality (as existential events) as the 
primary fact of any enquiry so that 
nature is to be seen in light of it. This 
implies that not only human reality 
cannot be a subordinate part of the 
natural universe, but the methods which 
are used to study the universe are not 
applicable to the phenomenon of 
humanity and human reality, because the 
latter is never  an “object” present to 
itself, that is subjective reality can never 
be made an “object-thing” in spite of the 
fact that this subjectivity is always 
tacitly assumed in all modes of vaguely 
understood objectivity. Thus existential 
phenomenology insists that the ultimate 
meaning  of the universe can be 
unfolded only by starting with  human 
reality as separate and different in kind 
from the realm of the objectivised 
nature.5  
 
The existence of humanity is 
intimately connected with the interiority 
of its intentional consciousness. But the 
affirmation of this interiority as a 
definition of the physically real human 
being leads naturally to the 
transcendence of the sphere of pure 
subjectivity through embodiment in 
order to become something special and 
concrete, that is to be placed in  a 
particular space and time. Human beings 
find themselves already in the world, in 
                                                
5 C.f.  Kant’s assertions  on irreducibility of 
reason  in Critique of Pure Reason, A553-557.  
a particular place and at a particular time, 
and it is through subjectivity they try to 
find understanding of their meaning 
which cannot be reached without 
transcending towards the world. This 
involves this subjectivity in a 
relationship with the world thus 
constituting the foundation of all 
meanings, associated with the 
articulation of the universe as a mode of 
this relationship which “produces the 
natural and antepredicative unity of the 
world and our life, being apparent in our 
desires, our evaluations and in the 
landscape we see, more clearly than in 
objective knowledge, and furnishing the 
text which our knowledge tries to 
translate into precise language” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.  xx). 
 
Existential phenomenology 
argues that the natural attitude with its 
opposition between subject and object 
must be overcome in order to discover 
the primordial field of the human being-
in-the-world, in which the actual contact 
with the thing “awakens within me a 
primordial knowledge of all things” and 
my finite and determinate perceptions’ 
become partial manifestations of a 
power of knowing which is coextensive 
with the world and unfolds it in full 
extent and depth” (Ibid., p. 430). By 
being completely encompassed and 
permeated by the world, there can not be 
anything in human beings which belongs  
to the world but does not belong to 
human beings.6  
                                                
6 This thought can be interpreted as  
consubstantiality between humanity and the 
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The involvement of human 
beings in the world, the access to the 
world, and to its meanings,  has its 
deepest ground in consciousness, which 
forms de facto the universal and sole 
medium of access.    However,  when 
one asserts the primacy of consciousness 
one means the perceptual consciousness 
which makes the contact with the reality 
which is not consciousness itself.7  This 
                                                                 
universe. However it does not preclude humanity 
from being incommensurable to the universe in 
terms of extended space and    time. In a 
theological stance, however, this does not mean 
that human beings cannot have a mode of 
existence different from the physical world.  In 
addition to this one must add that the term 
consubstantiality must be used with caution. The 
universe, as cosmology claims, consists of 96 
percent of matter  which ha no direct physical 
interactions with those atomic structures which 
constitute the visible universe and human bodies, 
in particular. However, one can speak in this 
case of consubstantiality with the universe in a 
transcendental sense: the invisible part of the 
universe are constituted through cosmological 
research as necessary cosmological elements for 
human existence. Thus the term consubstantiality 
reflects not only that link with the universe, 
which is empirically available, but has 
transcendental origin.  
7 In G. Marcel’s words: “My actual state of 
consciousness, which is bound up with the 
position of the organic body that it expresses, is 
the landmark in relation to which the infinite 
multiplicity of what can be thought by myself as 
existing is ordained. All existence can be traced 
back to this landmark,  and outside of all relation 
to it, it is only by an abstraction that we can think 
existence. To think a thing as existing  is to think 
oneself as the perceiver, it is to extend one’s 
experience in such a way that it comprehends 
even that which it appeared to leave outside itself. 
This does not imply the kind of subjective 
idealism which attributes a privileged value to 
the immediate date of perception, but only the 
affirmation that existence supposes a relation to 
an immediate thought in general, that is to say to 
my thought” (Marcel 1952, p. 14). 
is the sphere of immediate sense-
perceptions and meanings which forms 
the foundation which one needs in order 
to construct the world through a 
scientific thematization and 
conceptualisation. Consciousness being 
in an intricate link with the world does 
not represent itself entirely as an agency 
responsible for the constitution of the 
meaning;  for,  being responsible for the 
constitution of the meaning,  it at the 
same time is perceptive  of the meaning. 
Phenomenology doubts the legitimacy of 
any claim about existence of the ever-
made pre-existent world without human 
beings; but it also denies the possibility 
that the meaning of the world, as given 
together with the meaning of man, can 
have its foundation outside the bundle of 
the world and man. 
 
The sense of this “bundle” can be 
explicated through the terms: “dialogue” 
and “participation”.  This view implies 
that science does not represent an 
objectivising description of the world on 
the side of an epistemological subject, 
which does not belong to the world and 
extracted from it. Cosmology, taken in 
its ontological meaning is an event of the 
universe itself. In this sense cosmology 
is limited by an ontological status of the 
participant of the world. Here is an 
interesting explication of what is meant 
by the dialogue between humanity and 
the universe and participation in the 
universe’s constitution. According to J. 
Kockelmans the meaning of the world 
arises in the encounter between man and 
the world  and   “exists only in an 
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interplay of question and answer… 
Meaning arises  in a dialectic  
relationship between man and the world, 
but it is not possible to say which of the 
two first begins the ‘interplay’ and 
which of the two first gives meaning to 
the other” (Kockelmans 1966, p. 53). In 
similarity with this J. A. Wheeler 
asserted a dialogism in relation between 
man and nature: physical reality reveals 
itself as an evolving complex of 
meanings in the course of the interplay 
between questions and answers which 
the human subject addresses to and 
receives from that “out there” which is 
articulated by human observers as the 
physical  reality and nature. He writes: 
“Physics gives light and pressure-tools 
to query and to communicate. Physics 
also gives chemistry and biology and, 
through them, observer-participators. 
They, by way of the devices they employ, 
the questions they ask, and the 
registrations they 
communicate…develop all they know or 
ever can know about the world”  
(Wheeler 1988,  p. 5). The world is not a 
clock-like machine which has been pre-
constructed and then discovered by 
human observers; it is a self-synthesized  
system, coming into existence through 
the articulation of impersonal reality 
“out there” via questions and answers 
processed by a collective of persons-
observers who are capable of 
establishing the meaning  and 
interpretation of their observation-
participancy which ultimately leads to 
the constitution of the integral view of 
nature.  
 
By defining human existence as 
being-in-the-world, existential 
phenomenology asserts  an inherent 
relationality between humanity and the 
world, the relationality which constitutes 
their ontology as relationship, not just 
simple epistemological coordination. 
Then “knowledge” can be treated as a 
special mode of this relationship. The 
world-pole of this relationship then 
appears only as its projection to human 
consciousness, that is  things are 
presented to subjects as they “look” at 
them, but not what they are.8 Knowledge 
as a mode of relationship between 
humanity and the world can be described 
as a particular intentionality of the 
embodied consciousness towards the 
world, which treats this world as existing 
outside and independently of the sphere 
of subjectivity. This corresponds to the 
natural attitude which dissects the 
immediacy of being-in-the-world, 
extracting from it only the mode of its 
explicit or visible “presence” to 
consciousness. However,  the exercise of 
the natural attitude presupposes a kind of  
“pre-scientific” knowledge, as awareness 
of the surrounding “medium” in which 
human incarnate subjectivity functions, 
but which “shows” itself in its empirical 
                                                
8 As was expressed by P. Florensky, “All that 
which is knowable by us is that which is grasped 
by us, and by us transformed into 
ourselves…Through the act of knowledge all 
becomes our likeness” (Florensky  1994, p. 184). 
Things appear to humanity only within the 
context imposed by the very fact of its existence. 
In this sense the existence of things encodes the 
presence of humanity. By observing some things 
one can infer to the fact of existence of human 
beings. (Heidegger 1962, p. 88). 
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absence. 9  This “pre-scientific” 
knowledge can be described in terms of 
in terms of incarnation: “To be incarnate 
means to appear to itself as body, that is 
this particular body...” (Marcel 1940, p. 
31). Or, in different words: “Incarnation 
is the situation of a being who appears 
to himself to be, as it were, bound to a 
body.”10 In Marcel the ontological event 
when “existence comes into being” is 
linked to incarnation, which is a primary 
and incomprehensible mystery: all 
attempts to state what incarnation means  
are approximate and ultimately 
inadequate. Marcel calls the situation of 
incarnate existence a “concrete reality” 
which is neither  exclusively physical  
nor psychical but which marks the limits 
of  actions of an incarnate subject.    
 
                                                
9 F. Nietzsche  called this awareness “great 
reason of flesh” (c.f. ‘‘Von den Verächtern des 
Leibes,’’ Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch fu¨r 
Alle und Keinen (Nietzsche 1919)). Flesh does 
not mean the body, which, extended in the space 
of the world, is found there perceived or rather 
sensed, but it means my unique body, which 
alone senses the bodies of the world. It is my 
flesh that senses bodies that themselves do not 
sense: it senses everything else only by sensing 
itself sensing.  E. Levinas calls a similar mode of 
awareness as “non-intentional consciousness” 
which “accompanies all intentional processes of 
consciousness  and of myself who, within this 
consciousness, “acts” and “wishes”, and has 
“intentions”.  This is awareness of 
consciousness , indirect and implicit, without an 
initiative to get back on myself, without aim; a 
passive consciousness as time which passes and 
makes me old without my involvement” 
( Levinas 1998, p. 80).   
10 (Marcel 1965, p.16) (emphasis added). Marcel 
defines here existence in a way similar to that 
which was later used by E. Levinas, who spoke 
of hypostasis as an ontological event wherein 
“the existent contracts its existing” (Levinas 
1987, p. 43).  
The body, as individualised flesh 
in empirical space and time, plays a 
central role by co-ordinating the 
incarnate conscious self, with the rest of 
what this self treats as the objects of its 
intentional grasp. This co-ordination can 
be expressed in the language of 
consubstantiality of the human flesh 
with the material content of the universe: 
“To say that something exists is not only 
to say that it belongs to the same system 
as my body…, it is also to say that it is 
in some way united to me as my body 
is.” 11  The sensible universe then 
represents the extension of the body of 
humanity in a very non-trivial sense: it 
manifests the ongoing incarnation of 
humanity.12 Since incarnation, or “being 
                                                
11 (Marcel 1965,  p. 15). C.f. P. Florensky: 
“Bilogically, all that which surrounds us is our 
body, the extension of our body, the aggregate of 
our complimentary organs” (Florensky 1994, p. 
184). W. Heisenberg  expressed a similar 
thought by assigning  to technology the meaning 
of extended biological functions : “Technology 
no longer appears as the result of a conscious 
human effort to extend man’s material powers, 
but rather as a large-scale biological process in 
which man’s organic functions are increasingly 
transferred to his environment.” (Heisenberg 
1958, pp. 19-20). P.  Heelan proposes the 
manifest image of nature as the totality of 
empirical horizons reached by human subjects 
through embodied intentions. In this case the 
body as subject is used by these intentions to 
extend itself into the environment and then to be 
adapted to any bodily extension (Heelan 1972, 
pp. 497-501). 
12 (Marcel 1952, p. 259). Certainly this thought 
can be extended by saying that the past is not 
only related to my body as such. It is related to 
my conscious body which attempts to realise its 
past also in a strictly historical sense. To 
understand our past as history in general means 
to understand deeply and incorporate it in 
ourselves in order to become ourselves. One 
must attempt a breakthrough towards our past as 
 11 
in situation” cannot be objectified in 
terms of external constraints, the same is 
true with respect to space and time 
which, as part of one’s being in situation, 
come together with this situation.  Space 
expresses here some characteristic of 
dynamics of life, being thus a relational 
“entity” with respect to that human agent 
who makes room for itself as place and 
space. Making space constitutes a part of 
that creative development which 
accompanies any incarnation or being in 
situation, so that space acquires some 
specific forms of hypostatic expression 
of one’s being, providing thus forms of 
communication of different persons as 
different “beings in situation.”  
 
The co-ordination with the world 
is understood as an inherent 
consubstantiality, and it refers to what 
human beings share with each other and 
with the substance of the universe in a 
transcendental (not only empirical) sense. 
This means that the ‘matter’ and ‘nature’ 
have transcendental meaning as different 
expressions of that consubstantiality of 
the flesh with the whole universe. It is in 
this sense that one can argue that 
consubstantiality must not be understood 
only as sharing of nature and physical 
substance, but rather as a fundamental 
feature of  humanity that relates itself to 
the universe. In this sense 
consubstantiality  of flesh is related to 
the similarity in orders of creation.  
 
                                                                 
origin from which all our present and future 
emerges. C.f.  (Jaspers 1982, pp. 84, 117).    
Incarnation in flesh reveals itself 
in space through a particular body but it 
is itself not of space: the incarnate 
consciousness manifests itself as non-
local (that is transcending the boundaries 
of a body) and stretching across the 
universe thus carrying the whole world 
together with the body13;  while being in 
a body it is not of the body, and this is 
the reason why it  represents a typical 
situation when, in spite of its obvious  
personal presence as a body, the 
foundation of a sheer contingent facticity 
of this presence  is unavailable to 
consciousness’s grasp. Thus incarnation 
cannot be phenomenalised even to the 
reflective consciousness  of the incarnate 
person (no access to the mystery of 
one’s birth). This implies that every 
particular experience of the universe, as 
reflected and articulated through 
incarnation cannot be studied in the 
same way as the universe is studied in 
cosmology in the phenomenality of 
objects.  In cosmology the collective and 
anonymous subjectivity creates a picture 
of the universe where a concrete human 
consciousness acquires the features of a 
contingent  epiphenomenon of the 
physical by disregarding the centrality of 
the multihypostatic humanity  humanity 
as being the centre of disclosure of the 
universe from within the human, Divine 
– oriented history.   
 
 
                                                
13 This is a premise of commensurability 
between consciousness and the universe based in 
consubstantiality.  
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Humanity’s position  in the universe 
and paradox of human subjectivity 
  
In spite of simple philosophical truth that 
everything which is affirmed through 
observations and measurements receives 
its meaning and interpretation from 
within  human subjectivity, modern 
science is still wrestling with the idea 
that reality, let us say physical reality,  
cannot be alienated completely from the 
acts of an apprehending intellect. 
Science pursues in many of its areas the 
methodology which is historically 
identified with the name of Descartes 
and which in which it attempts to 
establish an ideal of objectivity of its 
theories by making a split between 
subjective conditions of any human 
knowledge and the meaning of this 
knowledge which it tries to objectify. 
According to this view the object of 
knowledge is an objectively existing 
world, which is fully explainable and 
can be expressed in precisely formulated 
laws. The fundamental premise of the 
natural attitude of science, is that the 
world  exists in itself in its entirety and 
possesses a rationality that can be fully 
understood.  Scientism, as a radical 
implication of the natural attitude,  
follows a definite criteria of objectivity, 
based on the principles of quantity: 
whatever can be quantified and 
mathematised according to certain rules, 
is objective by definition. All those 
aspects of “reality” which cannot be 
quantifiable are not objective  and  
therefore meaningless,   whereas the 
subject of knowledge, is treated as pure 
consciousness, which is fully transparent 
to itself and which faces the rational 
world objectively, that is,  it grasps the 
universal aspects of reality (the world is 
reduced to our consciousness of it).14 
This ideal of knowledge was a certain 
reaction against embodiment and an 
attempt to free the knowing subject from 
body’s situatedness or localising 
entanglements.   In view of some trends 
in contemporary philosophy of science 
this ideal of knowledge (which can be 
qualified as a sort of foundationalism) is 
arguable. It is enough to point towards 
research on transcendental appropriation 
of modern physics in order to realise that 
the very criteria for objectivity changed 
by taking into account the historical and 
instrumental context of  science which 
brings with it the human factor.15 This 
latter is ultimately linked to existential 
phenomenology’s stance on embodiment 
which avoids any lapsing in the 
foundationalism, because it positions its 
view on the cognising self as neither 
                                                
14 One should remind to the reader that the 
natural  attitude of exact sciences to what they 
called the “real” and “objective” stands in 
opposition to the philosophical attitude, which 
does not take for granted any presupposition of 
the given experience and anything pre-given as 
obviously existing.  The latter  considers it an 
error to assume that scientific knowledge is pure 
mirroring  of the world-in-itself, as well as the 
very assumption that there can be established an 
access to the world-in-itself in its absolute 
detachment from human senses and intelligibility.  
The overcoming of scientism and the natural 
attitude assumes thus that one cannot substitute 
the “objective” world of physical sciences for the 
fullness of experience of the  living world by  
human conscious beings.  




being grounded by the world nor being 
itself the ground of the world.  
 
In order to illustrate the point that 
knowledge in modern cosmology is 
imbued with human presence one may 
consider a simple example from popular 
scientific books which gives an account 
about the place of humanity in the 
overall structure of the universe. If one 
tries (in the natural attitude) to 
demonstrate the whole grandeur of the 
world in terms of typical sizes of objects, 
putting atoms, molecules, DNAs etc 
together with mega-objects like planets, 
stars, galaxies, clusters of galaxies and 
even the whole universe, then humanity 
finds itself in somewhat   strange 
situation because the planet Earth 
inhabited by human life, occupies a tiny 
portion of volume of the visible universe;  
also the spatial scale of human body 
(102cm) is negligible in comparison with 
the radius of the visible universe (1028 
cm). In a similar vein if the universe had 
a beginning 13.7 billion years ago, and 
then developed to its present state, it is 
not difficult to realize that the 
phenomenon of humanity  came into 
existence at a very late stage in the 
history of the universe, so that the 
universe was devoid of human life  (and 
hence devoid of self-expression) during 
the most part of its “history”.   It is then 
not difficult to realize that  if the human 
presence in the universe is judged from 
the point of view of its spatial and 
temporal dimension,  human beings, 
considered as physico-biological bodies, 
turn out to be  a contingent and  
insignificant part of the universe. 
 
The paradox which is  present 
here arises when one realises that the 
very representation of the universe as a 
whole, including all different levels of 
its physical structure, and the very 
positioning of all objects in the universe 
against a spatial grid, is the product of 
human intellectual activity. The paradox 
is obvious: the finite, even insignificant  
embodied human agencies in the vast 
universe articulate the entire universe 
from a point-like position in space and 
time.  Humanity actualises in knowledge  
the totality of the universe as its 
intentional correlate and this manifests a 
fundamentally non-local essence of 
human presence, being a quality and a 
mode of being which transcends the 
finitude of its corporeal place, as well as 
all particular objects and laws associated 
with this corporeity. 
 
One can see that if cosmology 
positions humanity in the vast universe, 
assuming that the universe (as entity) is 
pre-existent (with respect to the human 
intelligence), then, humanity represents  
a particular type of “objects”, passively 
dependent on the universe. The so called 
“anthropic inference” in cosmology 
refines assertions about humanity’s 
position in the universe by recapitulating 
consubstantiality of the universe and 
humanity in quantitative terms 
pertaining to specific embodiment.16 In a 
                                                
16 Literature on the “anthropic inference” in 
cosmology and associated fine-tuning is vast. 
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way, this is a trivial observation which 
affirms self-consistency of the human 
knowledge of the universe  with the 
physical conditions of embodiment 
which make knowledge possible. 
However, the anthropic inference deals 
with the necessary conditions for 
physical and biological existence of 
humanity and does not cover the 
hypothetical realm of its sufficient 
conditions, related to humanity’s 
intellectual capacity. 17 In this sense the 
famous and simplistic characteristic of 
humanity as “microcosm” turns out to be  
fundamentally insufficient. 18   The 
                                                                 
See, for example, a classical book of (Barrow, 
Tipler 1986) as well as more recent  (Barrow, 
Morris, Freeland, Harper 2008). 
17 The sufficient conditions become actual in the 
present state of technology when humanity can 
control the factors of life’s existence on the 
planet Earth from the side of  so to speak 
“negative conditions’: indeed it is in capacity to 
exterminate life on Earth so that the future 
continuation  of life depends not only on the 
natural conditions and possible disasters which 
can terminate this life, but also on a conscious 
desire to have this life. This desire, however 
belongs to the sphere of the human morality and 
humanity’s vision of its own destiny and that is 
why is not entirely controlled by the physical 
factors. In this sense the sufficient conditions of 
existence of humanity in the universe depend on 
humanity’s own vision of its place in the 
universe, its importance or non-importance for 
the fate of the universe itself. Correspondingly 
cosmological research turns out to be important 
as contributing to the realisation of  cosmic goals 
of humankind. (See discussion in (Nesteruk 
2003,pp. 195-208). 
18 Being popular in Classical Greek philosophy, 
the idea of microcosm was criticised in Christian 
literature because it did not take into account the 
intellectual abilities to disclose the sense of the 
universe. Consubstantiality is triviality and, 
according to Gregory of Nyssa, “there is nothing 
remarkable in Man’s being the image and 
likeness of the universe,...in thinking we exalt 
human nature by this grandiose name 
mystery of the sufficient conditions 
remains obscure in the same sense as the  
inability to account for the contingent 
facticity of all, including consciousness 
itself. In the natural attitude, where one 
attempts to explain the origin of 
consciousness as the epiphenomenon of 
the physical and biological one fails to 
recognise that it attempts to explain itself 
from itself. This fallacious logical circle 
originates in the fact that physics and 
biology operate in the framework of the 
already given consciousness but this 
very consciousness never becomes their 
subject matter. 19  A. Gurwitsch 
comments on this accentuating the 
personal dimension of embodied 
consciousness: “what is decisive and 
crucial importance is not whether the 
existence of consciousness is conceded 
or denied  but rather that, even if this 
existence is conceded, consciousness 
and whatever pertains to it are 
considered as “private” and thus not on 
principle subject to scientific 
investigation” (Gurwitsch 1974, p. 133). 
It is because science cannot 
                                                                 
(microcosm, synthesis of the universe) we forget 
that we are thus favouring it with the qualities of 
gnats and mice. (Quoted in (Clément 2000, p. 
34). Gregory’s  comparison of humanity with 
mice is remarkable, because it is a very popular 
nowadays to advocate, on the grounds of  
biological evolution, that humanity did not 
progress too far from the animal-like state 
because humans and mice share 96 percent of 
their DNA.   
19 B. Carr comments on this situation in physics: 
“That physics has little to say about the place of 
man in the universe is perhaps not surprising 
when one  considers the fact that most physicists 
probably regard man, and more generally 
consciousness, as being entirely irrelevant to the 
functioning of the universe”( Carr 1998, p. 152). 
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accommodate the dimension of 
personhood that it has to abandon the 
reference to embodiment at all and to 
treat consciousness as a medium of 
access which is hypostatically uniform 
and thus non-observable. Through such 
an oblivion human presence becomes  
irrelevant to the universe whereas 
sciences themselves become obscure. 20 
As it was eloquently put by Merleau-
Ponty: “Scientific points of view, 
according to which my existence is a 
moment of the world’s are always both 
naïve and at the same time  dishonest, 
because they take for granted, without 
explicitly mentioning, it, the other point 
of view, namely that of consciousness, 
through which from the outset of a world 
forms itself round me and begins to exist 
for me.”21   
                                                
20 A. Gurwitsch described this state of affairs as 
inability of science to give an account of its own 
possibility and efficacy: “All questions 
concerning human reason …are eliminated from 
the sciences;.. if the human mind and human 
rationality are either overlooked or explained 
away in a naturalistic fashion, the sciences 
themselves become unintelligible; …the sciences 
appear as most ingenious technical devices 
which one may learn to use…but whose interior 
mechanism and functioning remain utterly 
obscure” (Gurwitsch, 1966, pp. 399-400). 
21 (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. ix). Apart from 
inadequacy in comprehension of foundations of 
science the whole stream of thought can be 
supplemented by a spiritual  sentiment, namely 
that separating the world and the universe from 
the conditions of functioning of human 
subjectivity, science based on the natural attitude, 
by using the words of the Russian philosopher S. 
Bulgakov,  acquires lifeless intentionality and 
orientates us in the kingdom of dead things 
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 207). A French 
phenomenologist E. Minkowski expressed in a 
similar way that everything that science touches 
“becomes something immobile,  dead nature” 
(Minkowski 1970, p. 246). 
 
The ambivalence in assessing of 
humanity’s position in the universe can 
be expressed in terms of a famous 
philosophical paradox asserting that 
while  being in the universe, humanity is 
not of the universe that is, in a certain 
sense, it transcends the universe by 
“holding” it through humanity’s grasp.  
The dualism in human position in the 
world, which is present in this paradox, 
constitutes the inherent feature of any  
cosmological discourse which has to  
reconcile the locality and contingency of 
cosmic position of humanity  with its 
abilities to transcend this locality and 
encompass in theory the universe as a 
whole. Any naturalistic attempt to 
suppress or subvert the essential 
ambiguity of consciousness of being in 
the world22 and, at the same time, of the 
whole world distorts a truly scientific 
interpretation of the universe.  
 
The abovementioned paradox 
was coined by E. Husserl as “the 
paradox of human subjectivity being a 
subject for the world and at the same 
time being an object in the world”. 23 
                                                
22 In words of A. Gurwitsch “[Consciousness’s] 
acts, on the one hand, depend functionally upon 
extra-consciousness facts and events, in this 
sense being effects of the latter, and, on the other 
hand, have presentational and cognitive  function 
with regard to all mundane events and acts, 
including those upon which they depend 
causally” (Gurwitsch 2010, p. 160). 
23 Husserl formulated this paradox as follows 
[mention that Husserl formulated this paradox in 
the context of analysis of science]: “Universal 
intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, 
everything that exists at all, is resolved, can 
obviously be nothing other than mankind; and 
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However, in its essence it was known 
since ancient times, and Kant, for 
example, expressed it in his Critique of 
Practical Reason as the difference in 
appreciation of  the things which fill the 
human mind with “the  starry heavens 
above and the moral law within”: “The 
former begins from the place I occupy in 
the external world of sense, and enlarges 
my connection therein to an unbounded 
extent with worlds upon worlds and 
systems of systems, and moreover into 
limitless times of their periodic motion, 
its beginning and continuance. The 
second begins from my invisible self, 
my personality, and exhibits me in a 
world which has true infinity, but which 
is traceable only by the understanding, 
and with which I discern that I am not in 
a merely contingent but in a universal 
and necessary connection, as I am also 
thereby with all those visible worlds.”24 
                                                                 
the latter is undeniably a component part of the 
world. How can a component part of the world, 
its human subjectivity, constitute the whole 
world, namely, constitute it as its intentional 
formation…?” (Husserl 1970,  p. 179). 
24 (Kant 1959, p. 260) (emphasis related to 
“infinity” has been added)). Kant’s usage of the 
adjective “infinite” has a two-fold meaning here: 
on the one hand he speaks of the “true infinity” 
as that  which is related to what things really are, 
not simply to their appearances. On the other 
hand, speaking of the “infinite elevation” he, de 
facto makes a statement of the 
incommensurability of human beings with all 
other natural things. The incommensurability, 
which is in different words can be described as  
the unbridgeable gulf between human person 
who articulate the things in the universe, and 
these very things which have no power of self-
reflection and articulation at all. More than that 
the very notion of infinity as arising from 
freedom and inexhaustibility of the moral law is 
typically an human attribute in spite of a 
fundamental finitude of the human embodiment 
The paradox received numerous 
formulations and interpretation (see 
(Carr 1999)) so that we provide the 
reader with a few clarifying references. 
M. Merleau-Ponty, rephrased the same 
paradox in the context of the tension 
between two descriptions of the human 
condition: “on the one hand man is a part 
of the world; on the other, he is the 
constituting consciousness of the world”; 
this tension is to be overcome on the 
ways of existentialism. 25  E. Fromm, 
departing from a psychological 
dimension,  gave to this paradox a status 
of “existential dichotomy” arising from 
the fact that, according to him, man 
emerged in being as “anomaly” and “the 
freak” of the universe, whose being in a 
state of constant and unavoidable 
disequilibrium, anxiety, dissatisfaction 
and restlessness, which follow from 
being part of nature and transcending 
it. 26  Similarly to Fromm, R. Ingarden 
                                                                 
and the fact that it is because of this that 
anything which is received by us is conditioned, 
that is finite. (See more details in (Moore 1988) 
25 “There are two classical  views: one treats man 
as the result of the physical, physiological, and 
sociological influences which shape him from 
the outside and make him one thing among many; 
the other consists of recognizing an a-cosmic 
freedom in him, insofar as he is spirit and 
represents to himself the very causes which 
supposedly  act upon him.” (Merleau-Ponty 1982, 
pp. 71-72.)     
26 In Fromm’s  words “He [man] is set apart 
while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to 
the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into 
the world at  an  accidental place and time, he is 
forced out of it, again accidentally. Being aware 
of himself, he realises his powerlessness and the 
limitations of his existence. He visualises his 
own end: death. Never is he free from the 
dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself 
of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot 
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describes the existential dichotomy as a 
very special and doubly-complexioned 
of man’s feeling of being, on the one 
hand, quite alien to everything that 
happens in nature independently of him, 
so that he sees himself deprived by it of 
any kindly help and almost loses trust in 
fate; on the other hand, “in his pure and 
autonomous essence he feels himself to 
be something that stands out above 
nature, something that is so much more 
dignified than purely physical processes 
or what transpires in animals, that he 
cannot feel in solidarity with nature and 
live fully happily by being united with it 
in its domain” (Ingarden 1983, p. 17-18). 
According to Fromm and Ingarden’s 
insights humanity, when it narrows it 
perception of the place in the universe to 
the status of  a thing among other things, 
dooms itself  to depression and anxiety 
of its own insignificance in the vast 
cosmos because life is enslaved and 
controlled by it. Contrary to this the 
cosmos  acquires some inward meaning 
if humanity sees itself as the centre of its 
disclosure and manifestation. Then the 
universe receives intrinsic human 
qualities thus being united to humanity: 
the question then is not of being 
positioned in the universe, but that of 
living here and now in communion with 
the universe. But this communion means 
much more than sheer consubstantiality. 
It means that a human being can 
“transcend” the universe while retaining 
its immanence with the universe. As was 
emphatically asserted by M. Scheler: 
                                                                 
rid himself of his body as long as he is alive…” 
(Fromm 1967, p. 40).  
“Only man, because he is  person, can 
rise above himself as a living being and 
make all to be its subject of knowledge, 
including himself, as if he would be a 
single centre on the other side of the 
space-time world.  But this centre of 
human acts appropriating  the world, its 
own body and its psyche cannot be  itself 
a “part” of this world, that is, it cannot 
have any definite “where” and “when”; 
it can only be in the highest foundation 
of being.  Thus man is a being which is 
above himself and the world.” (Scheler 
1994, p. 160). 
 
Hermann Weyl invoked this 
paradox as a riddle of the two-fold 
nature of ego, which, according to him, 
is beyond the limits of science: “On the 
one hand I am a real individual man, 
born by a mother and destined to die, 
carrying out real physical and psychical 
acts, one among many…On the other 
hand, I am ‘vision’ open to reason, a 
self-penetrating light immanent sense-
giving consciousness or, however you 
may call it, and as such unique. 
Therefore I can say to myself both: ‘I 
think, I am real and conditioned” as well 
as “I think and in my thinking I am free” 
(Weyl 2009, p. 197). The paradox of 
human subjectivity reflects the 
fundamental existential dichotomy of the 
incarnate human condition as that 
primary reality from which any realistic 
cosmology and its philosophy must 
originate. And it is the inability of 
science to account for this paradox that 
leads inevitably to transcending 
tendencies to look for its foundation 
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through the other-worldly 
connotations.27  
 
 Such connotations were 
implicitly present in theology and 
religious philosophy. As an example, we 
provide  few  quotations from the earlier 
Christian literature as well as from the 
20th century religious philosophy which 
explicate the sense of the paradox. Here 
is a passage from St. Gregory the 
Theologian (Naziansus) (dates) with a 
characteristic formulation of the paradox: 
“…Having decided to demonstrate this, 
the Artificier of the universe, the Logos, 
created man as a single living creature 
from both elements, that is to say from 
the nature of both the visible and the 
invisible worlds. On the one hand He 
took the body from already pre-existing 
matter, on the other He endowed it with 
breath from Himself, which Scripture 
terms the intelligent soul and the image 
of God (Gen. 1:27; 2:7). He sat man 
upon the earth as a second world, a great 
world in a little one, as a new kind of 
angel, adoring God with both aspects of 
his twofold being, fully initiated into the 
visible creation but only partially into 
the invisible, king of all that exists on 
earth   but subject to the King above,  
both earthly and heavenly, both transient 
[by natureAN] and immortal [by the 
image AN], both visible [sensible by 
body AN] and invisible [intelligible by 
reason AN] , situated between greatness 
[lord of the universe AN]  and lowliness 
                                                
27 The detailed discussion of the paradox of 
human subjectivity in a theological context can 
be found in (Nesteruk 2008, pp. 178-84). 
[slave of the universe AN], at the same 
time both spirit and flesh…”28. In St. 
Maximus the Confessor (dates) the 
paradox was interpreted in the context of 
faith in  God who created man in his 
own image and likeness, so that initially 
man was “like” God, that is  he was “all 
in all”. C.f. (Col. 3:11). For example, 
Maximus the Confessor described this 
presence of man in all things in terms of 
a potential unity of all creation, which 
was to be realised by man as originally 
created: “…man was introduced last 
among existent things, as the natural 
bond mediating between the extremes of 
the whole through his own parts, and 
bringing into unity in his own person 
those things which are by nature far 
distant from each other…”29    Man was 
created in order to mediate between all 
divisions in creation, for example 
between the sensible (visible) and 
intelligible (invisible); he writes:  “As a 
compound of soul and body he [man] is 
limited essentially by intelligible and 
sensible realities, while at the same time 
he himself defines [articulates] these 
realities through his capacity to 
apprehend intellectually and perceive 
with his senses.” 30  For Maximus, 
however,  the dichotomy, present in this 
affirmation   was not a problem, for 
according to his theological position the 
fundamental non-locality which is 
present in human insight about the 
                                                
28 Oration 45, On Easter, 7 [ET: (Nellas 1997, p. 
203)]. 
29 Ambigua 41, PG 91, 1304-1312B [ET: (Nellas 
1997, p. 212)]. 
30 Ambigua 10:26, PG  91, 1153B  [ET: (Palmer 
et al 1986, p. 277)]. 
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universe originates from the human 
ability (as God-given) to comprehend 
the intelligible realm which contains 
ideas about the universe as a whole.  
 
Another quotation  is from a 
Russian religious philosopher N. 
Berdyaev: “There are in personality 
natural foundation principles which are 
linked with the cosmic cycle. But the 
personal in man is of different extraction 
and of different quality and it always 
denotes a break with natural necessity. ... 
Man  as personality is not part of nature, 
he has within him the image of God. 
There is nature in man, but he is not 
nature. Man is a microcosm and 
therefore he is not part of the cosmos” 
(Berdyaev 1944, pp. 94-95) 31 ; hence 
                                                
31 Berdyaev insists that the mystery of human 
personhood  is related to its dual nature:  on the 
one hand to its intrinsic natural (physical)  
necessity, and on the other hand to its ability to 
transcend  the limits of this nature as being an 
image and likeness of the highest being, as  a 
microcosm before whom stands the whole 
majesty of nature (Berdyaev 1944, p. 81; 1989, 
pp. 294-96). Berdyaev blames the science of his 
time for not being able to realise the depth of the 
problem of humanity and, according to him, this 
is why one must ascend to religious philosophy, 
which is the only means that can handle the 
problem of man. Another representative of 
Russian religious philosophy and Orthodox 
theology, Fr. Sergei Bulgakov, also builds his 
attitude to science on the basis of a criticism of  
its fragmented description of reality  and limited 
capacity of comprehending the world as living 
nature. The mathematical universe expels living 
subjects by converting it into the kingdom of 
shadows and “subjectless” objects: “science 
exercises the intentional murder of the world and 
nature, it studies the corpse of  nature…” 
(Bulgakov 1993, p. 199). Bulgakov realises, just 
as Berdyaev did, the fundamental    paradox of 
science: on the one hand science transforms the 
world into a lifeless mechanism, on the other 
“the place of man in the natural world is 
tragic. Man is not only an object in this 
world, first of all he is subject  which 
cannot be deduced from an object. 
Taken with  this the relation of man to 
cosmos is defined by its being 
microcosm;  he enfolds cosmos and 
history.  Man cannot be a part of 
something, he is the whole. Through the 
spiritual in him, man is not subordinated 
to nature and independent of it although 
natural forces can kill him. If man would 
be just a natural and finite being, his 
death would not be so tragic: what is 
tragic is death of an immortal being who 
aspire to infinity. Only from an object-
perspective man is part of nature; from a  
spiritual perspective, nature is in him. He 
is a slave of nature and he is its lord” 
(Berdyev 2003, p. 588). This can be 
paralleled with P. Florensky, according 
to whom “nature and man are both 
infinite. And it is because of being 
infinite, that they are commensurable 
and can be parts of each other…Man is 
in the world, but man is complex to the 
same extent as the world. The world is in 
man, but the world  is also complex as 
man” (Florensky 1994, p. 188); “Man is 
                                                                 
hand, science itself was produced through the 
self-determination of the subject in the object (p. 
205). The source of science, the foundation of its 
possibility, is to be found in humanity. 
Otherwise science becomes no more than an 
ingenious tool whose ultimate sense remains 
utterly obscure. Bulgakov anticipated this way of 
thought by formulating the thesis that  to 
understand science one should turn to the 
understanding of man. It is not science that 
explains man, but man who explains science. 
Philosophy of science is a branch of 
philosophical anthropology (p. 188). 
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the recapitulation of the world, its 
summary; the world is the disclosure of 
man, its projection” (Ibid., p. 187). S. 
Bulgakov contributed to the same stream 
of thought: “On the one hand, man is 
potential all, the potential centre of the  
antropo-cosmos, which, although, not 
yet realised but is being realised, on the 
other hand man is the product of this 
world, of the empirical” (Bulgakov 1993, 
p. 160). Another Russian religious 
philosopher V. Nesmelov describes the 
human knower as both a living organism 
and  a transcendental subject. According 
to Nesmelov man is a Person who 
asserts itself as a free agent of its own 
volitions and is called by Nesmelov as 
absolute and unconditional being 
because he knows through knowing 
himself. The human person represents 
that link, or pole of being,  where the 
unconditional and conditional meet 
(Nesmelov 1905, pp. 64-65).32  
 
The implicit presence of the 
paradox in all scientific affirmations of 
the universe reflects the intrinsic split 
between the two different modes of 
intentionality.  The self-awareness of its 
                                                
32 Nesmelov points to the vanity of all scientific 
attempts to “explain” personhood in its incarnate 
conditions. In its displayed givenness  it can be 
studied, but the fact of its existence, as a real fact, 
can only be interpreted through the help of the 
Bible, in which  the existence of man is posed as 
a fact of the relationship between God and the 
world. It is the mystery of the facticity of the 
hypostatic being of persons that leads all 
philosophy and science to the idea of the free 
creation of persons by God, persons which 
sustain that mode of being from within which the 
disclosure and manifestation of the universe take 
place. 
own transcendental nature happens when 
the intentionality has to deploy its means 
to cope with the constraints and 
pressures of the outer world 
(embodiment,  for example). The more 
the universe attempts to crush human 
existence  under the weight of 
astronomical facts, the more the 
egocentric intentionality prevails as a 
measure of resistance to it. The more the 
pressure of the outer world relaxes, the 
more the same intentionality relaxes and 
the transcendental “I” looses itself in the 
outer things. Thus the constraints of the 
constitution of the outer world which 
escape clear-cut definitions  and 
visibility constitute the very 
intentionality to the extent that it cannot 
fully cope with these constraints 
(Vialatoux 1965, p. 34). Then one can 
see that the paradox of human 
subjectivity is not simply an 
epistemological conundrum, it reflects a 
genuine ambiguity or bipolarity of 
human beings, which must be balanced 
and existentially balanced (c.f. 
(Leprince-Ringuet 1973, p. 164). S. 
Frank made a valuable comment that any 
attempt to remove this ambiguity or 
explain it away leads to the distorted 
anthropology and hence cosmology: 
 
Through his body and carnal life, and 
external layer of his mind determined by 
its connection with the body, man in 
himself forms part – a subordinate and 
insignificant part – of the objective 
world….Through his depths – through 
the kernel or root of his being, and in 
this sense through his true essence – he 
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belongs to the transcendent primary 
reality….(Frank 19??, p. 34). Man thus 
has a dual nature, and every theory of 
life which fails to account of both 
aspects of his being is bound to be 
inadequate (Ibid.). ..The structure of our 
being is complex and antinomic, and all 
artificial simplification distorts it (Ibid., 
p. 35). 
 
The dichotomy between faith and reason 
by the virtue of its factual existence 
manifests and explicates the complex 
life of man as being split in its 
intentionalities between the mundane 
things of the world and their underlying 
foundation, including the foundation of 
the very consciousness which is 
responsible  for the facticity of both, 
theology and science.  
 
Spatial and temporal expression of the 
paradox of human subjectivity  
 
The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
world can be understood in a different 
way.  On the one hand, being 
inseparable from reality in virtue of its 
embodied intentional consciousness, 
human persons can exist only in the 
context of their immediate non-distance 
from reality (consubstantiality). On the 
other hand, being a hypostatic formation 
(humanity is endowed with an ability to 
inhere the universe in its own 
subjectivity through the fusion of 
knowledge, to form the meaning and act 
in the universe as its self-consciousness 
and self-realization, or, theologically 
speaking, as its hypostasis 33 ), that is 
being fundamentally different from other 
material things, human persons are 
“infinitely” ontologically distant from 
those other things (which makes it 
possible to neutralise object within the 
primary relationship with subject and 
transform it into one-sided submission34). 
The ability to distance themselves from  
outer things (even, in abstraction, from 
one’s own body), makes human persons 
equally positioned with respect to all 
objects in the universe, so that they can 
be articulated by human subjectivity as 
different and uniformly distant from it. 
Paradoxically, on the one hand, because 
of  the infinite ontological distance from 
all things in the universe humanity is 
hypostatically commensurable  (and thus 
equally close) with respect to all objects 
in the universe,  including the universe 
as a whole, whereas on the other hand, 
being corporeally at non-distance from 
the universe, humanity is physically 
incommensurable with the universe.  
 
 The paradox of human 
subjectivity can be formulated in terms 
of space, that is in terms of humanity’s 
topological position in the universe (this 
will make the paradox even more close 
to the paradox of space in the 
Incarnation35).  The formulation of the 
paradox in terms of space is achieved 
through a metaphor of the container and 
                                                
33 See the explication of this in (Nesteruk 2003), 
ch. 7. 
34 See more in (Yannaras 2004, p. 114). 
35See on the topological paradox of incarnation 
(Torrance 1997); (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 226-36); 
also  (Nesteruk 2013, pp. 323-28). 
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of the contained: on the one hand by its 
physical and biological parameters 
humanity is contained in the universe, on 
the other hand the universe itself is 
“contained” by  human subjectivity as its 
intentional correlate (that is 
enhypostatically). In this formulation the 
ontological centrality of humanity is 
contraposed to its cosmographic 
mediocrity (cosmological principle). The 
distinction between two worlds is 
accentuated here: the one which is 
affirmed by cosmology as existing 
whole and scientifically thematised in 
terms of elements and essences, and  
another one, associated with the 
immediate life of consciousness, the so 
called life-world, the medium of 
indwelling into which every human 
being is brought into existence. For 
every particular being their life-world, 
being “here and now”, is linked to the 
planet Earth and thus is geocentric. Earth 
is ontologically  central in a spiritual 
sense (c.f. (Lossky 1997, p. 64)), in the 
sense of “wherefrom” manifestations 
and disclosure of the universe do 
originate. In spite of the fact that 
astronomy and cosmology deal with 
Earth as an object and ascribe to it a 
movement in space, both of them were 
produced by human beings on Earth, and 
it was here, on this planet, that scientific 
thought developed  the definitions of 
motion, rest,  space understood in a 
general objective sense.  Cosmologists’ 
statements concerning the indifferent 
position of Earth in cosmic space 
(cosmological principle) receive their 
meaning from experiences acquired here, 
on the planet Earth. The here which is 
the place of this initial experience is not 
therefore a place in space, since it is 
itself a place of origin of a notion of 
space.36 In this sense the cosmological 
principle, as a philosophical hypothesis 
articulating the uniformity of space at 
large, enters into contradiction with the 
singular and unique “here” which is 
radically incomparable with any “there” 
thus predetermining the non-
homogeneous  topology in any ideation 
about space at large. The nontrivial 
nature of this last comment follows from 
a phenomenological stance on space as 
not pre-existent objective out there 
originating from subject’s passive 
contemplation of it, but in terms of 
subject’s comportment “in” it. This, so 
called, attuned space becomes an initial 
instant and a medium of disclosure of 
that “objective” space through relation to 
which this subject is constituted as 
corporeal existence in the universe. 
However this relationship is manifest of 
a  paradox similar to that of the container 
and of the contained put in an 
interrogative form: how can  one grasp 
the relationship of a particular being 
(subject) as if it “in” space when this 
being is essentially constituted by being 
‘over against’, and hence beyond 
space?37 
                                                
36 This is theologically similar to what Christ as 
the Logos experiences with respect to the whole 
universe: the universe, being a spatial extension 
with respect to his human nature, is beyond 
space, that is not in space, with respect to his 
divine nature. 
37 (Ströker 1965, p. 15). This reminds a Kantian 
stance on human being as being simultaneously 
phenomenon and noumenon: on the one hand 
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What is obvious, however is that 
the constitution of space, first of all of 
the attuned space is  intertwined with 
and not detachable from the fundamental 
aspect of human embodiment or 
corporeity, where the latter manifests 
itself as a living being in relation to other 
beings and to the world, in whom this 
relation is announced and articulated in a 
way of its sense-reaction and its 
comportment, or its action in situation. 
In this sense the constitution of space in 
all its varieties (from attuned space to 
mathematical space of the universe) 
represents the modes of explication of 
embodiment or corporeity through which 
human beings interact with the world. 
Thus the lived body entails a kind of 
lived space which bears the character of 
self-givenness “in the flesh”. In other 
words the initial point of any discourse 
on corporeity and associated spatiality 
implies a kind of knowledge as presence  
“in person” or “in the flesh” as a mode 
of givenness of an object in its standing 
in front of the functioning corporeity. 
 
In cosmology, by articulating the 
entirety of the universe human beings 
remain corporeal, so that their 
corporeality as relationship to all things 
contains in its facticity the very premise 
of being incommensurable physically 
and commensurable hypostatically to the 
                                                                 
space is an a-priori form of sensibility which 
allows a subject to order its experience; on the 
other hand this form of sensibility is unfolded 
not from within that space which is depicted by 
it, that is it comes from beyond any possible 
spatial presentation of experience. 
totality which humanity attempts to 
reveal in cosmology. The attitude to this 
totality is two-fold: on the one hand 
humanity attunes to it through belonging 
to it; on the other hand, through a non-
egocentric intentionality humanity 
positions itself as if it were beyond the 
universe,  “looked” at this universe as an 
object and depict the latter as something 
being present over against “the flesh” 
and in person.  However, since humanity 
cannot  abandon its position of corporeal 
existence in situation on the planet Earth, 
all cosmological models contain the 
elements of this given embodiment even 
in those cases when they predicate the 
universe in trans-human or even non-
human (the early universe or multiverse) 
terms. In other words, the 
commensurability with the universe, as 
the transferral of some human qualities 
to it, is not of space, but originates in 
space. 38  
 
 And finally, a brief note on the 
temporal dimension of the paradox39 . 
Despite science’s claims that intelligent 
humanity is an insignificant and 
accidental evolutionary artefact in the 
                                                
38 For human beings to achieve the sense of 
commensurability with the universe one must be 
in space as a delimiter of their embodiment.  
Interestingly that this conclusion is similar to a 
Christian theological stance on space in the 
context of knowledge of God. It is because the 
incarnation of the Logos of God took place in 
rubrics of space and time, that no knowledge of 
God is possible outside the ways of Christ in 
space and time. (See, for example, (Torrance 
1997)). 
39 C.f. N. Berdyaev’s  “Meditation on the 
eschatological metaphysics. Creativity and 
Objectification”,  in (Berdyaev 2003, p. 523).  
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material universe40, philosophers object 
to this by pointing out that human 
consciousness cannot be explained in 
terms of cosmic factors as well as in 
terms of the evolutionary theories (both 
cosmological and biological) that 
themselves are mental creations. This 
brings a temporal dimension to the 
paradox by pointing out that any 
speculation about the world as it existed 
prior to emergence of conscious 
humanity is a dubious enterprise, for 
what is affirmed as existing in pre-
historical time  still has features of that 
consciousness which is limited by the 
conditions of embodiment at present.41 
This implies that the very history of the 
universe, given through the display of its 
frozen past, has sense only through the 
historical consciousness of human 
beings. 
 
If human history is treated only 
as an epiphenomenon or as a 
continuation of the natural history of the 
universe, then the emergence of the 
phenomenon of humanity in the late 
history of the universe is merely a 
contingent aspect of cosmic and 
biological evolution and thus has no 
philosophical meaning.  Any question 
about mankind’s significance or 
insignificance has meaning only if the 
                                                
40 Some scientists, however, claim that the 
universe is intrinsically imbued with life, so that 
is outcome is not an accident. See, for example, 
in this respect (De Duve 1995); see also  (Barrow 
et al. 2008). 
41 The discussion of problems connected with the 
description of those eras which were not lived 
through by human consciousness can be found, 
for example, in (Aron 1938, pp. 39-46). 
whole of natural history is seen through 
the “teleological eyes”, which are 
themselves not an integral part of the 
scientific attitude. If, on the contrary, 
human history is not only distinguished 
from the natural history of the universe, 
but actually understood as incorporating 
natural history as the unfolding 
constitution of the world and humanity 
within human history, then human 
history ceases to be a part of cosmic 
determinism and acquires some features 
of a “trial”, an “event” (the “humankind-
event” 42 ) in which man’s intrinsic 
freedom and a dualistic standing in the 
universe are encapsulated. 43  The 
centrality of humanity’s position in the 
universe (as a subject of history of this 
universe) thereby acquires some 
teleological connotations: the universe 
needs humanity in order to be explored 
and thus transfigured (through 
knowledge) through the acquisition of 
the sense contrary to its seeming non-
sensical contingent facticity.   This point 
gives another dimension to the stance of  
phenomenological philosophy  that the 
world is radically human in a non-trivial  
sense: “if man is attached to the world, 
the world likewise is attached to man, in 
such a way that it is no longer possible 
to speak about a world-without-man” 
(Luijpen 1960, p. 25). The world, being 
a container for humanity is contained by 
human person not through the power of  
                                                
42 This is terminology from (Nesteruk 2003), ch. 
7. C.f. (Morin 1982, p.120). 
43 C.f. with the Orthodox cosmology’s claim that 
cosmic history is part of the history of salvation 
related to humanity, and not vice versa (see 
(Clément 1976, p. 80). 
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physical forces (consubstantiality), but 
through the power of  intellect, which 
makes humanity as conscious persons 
equally, that is, qualitatively distant 
from the world  in its apprehending 
capacity to articulate the world.   
 
The paradox of human subjectivity 
and personhood. 
 
The paradox of human subjectivity in the 
universe can be further explicated as 
pointing towards the different positions 
human subjectivity can adopt with 
respect to ontology of being. On the one 
hand there is an explicit treatment of the 
world in terms of thinghood, that is, in 
terms of things pregiven in order to be 
recognised by thinking consciousness. In 
this sense the universe pre-exists as 
substance and the ultimate ontology of 
being is thought to be the ontology of 
this substance. Then the facticity of 
human beings in the universe is treated 
as the variation of this substance. In this 
case, humanity  being a part of the 
universe experiences fear that the laws 
of the universe with their contingent, but 
fine-tuned outcomes at some stage can 
remove the phenomenon of humankind 
from it.  On the other hand there is a 
different intuition that things which are 
out there, objects and entities in the 
universe appear not as external and 
hostile environment but as the 
manifestation of the living presence of 
humanity in the universe which actually 
makes all these things beings. The 
making of the universe must not be 
understood as manufacturing things from 
some pre-given material, but rather as 
creating things in a rather different sense. 
To create in the sense of personhood 
means not to physically dominate the 
pregiven, but to create such an 
ontological situation where all so called 
things acquire the “presence” relevant to 
the totality of existence understood not 
in terms of substance but in terms of 
hypostasis (personhood). Humanity itself 
becomes present and manifest through 
transferring its hypostasis to being. This 
hypostasis is not something which ‘pre-
exists’ in substance  or in nature, it is not 
an impersonal combination of the 
worldly elements or platonic forms, but 
the center and the ultimate beginning of 
all articulated existence.44  
 
 The paradox of human 
subjectivity can thus be explicated as  
the tension between ontologies of being 
based either on substance or on 
hypostasis. For example, in modern 
physics and cosmology the grandeur of 
the world is understood  through 
particles, fields, space-time, planets, 
galaxies, the whole universe,  but, as we 
have pointed out above,  there is no 
place for human subjectivity and 
personhood. The personal characteristics 
of those who create the physical picture 
of the world are remarkably missing 
from the very result of their activity. One 
can say that while being tacitly present 
behind the works of  its own creation, 
personhood as the source of this 
                                                
44 See more details on the explication of the 
meaning of “hypostasis” in (Nesteruk 2003), ch. 
7. 
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creativity, is absent from its own 
creation. The picture of the universe is 
the manifestation of personal presence in 
the universe, but persons who created 
this picture are not explicitly found in 
it. 45   Cosmology in its outward 
expression creates such conditions for 
unconcealment of the universe which  
takes place at the expense of 
concealment of persons.  
 
Personhood is missing from the 
natural sciences because they approach 
human beings in the same way as they 
approach other things, that is in the 
phenomenality of objects: one needs to 
“mortify” human beings and reduce 
them either to “walking dust” or to 
impersonal physico-biological robots in 
order to affirm their presence by means 
of observation and rational induction. 
                                                
45 In terms of a  historical reference one can 
point to Erwin Schrödinger who in his work 
“Mind and Matter” empathically  exposed a state 
of affairs in “the world of science” 
(contemporary to him) as “becoming so horribly 
objective as to leave no room for the mind and 
its immediate sensations” (Schrödinger 1992, p. 
120). In the same paper he wrote: “Mind has 
erected the objective outside world of the natural 
philosopher out of its own stuff. Mind could not 
cope with this gigantic task otherwise than by the 
simplifying device of excluding itself – 
withdrawing from its conceptual creation. Hence 
the latter does not contain its creator”. (Ibid., p. 
121, see also p. 122). To make his arguments 
stronger Schrödinger quotes similar passages 
from C. G. Jung (“The flood of external objects 
of cognisance has made the subject of all 
cognisance withdraw to the background, often to 
apparent non-existence”, p. 120) and C. 
Sherrington (“mind, the anything perception can 
compass, goes therefore in our spatial world 
more ghostly than a ghost….It remains without 
sensual confirmation and remains without it 
forever”, p. 121.)  
 
But personhood as existential events  
escapes scientific grasp by transcending 
either materialistic definitions or  
idealistic beliefs. Personhood manifests 
itself as that givenness which cannot be 
subjected to any constraints of  matter or 
categories of the understanding. This is 
the reason why it is  impossible to define 
personhood in the way one defines 
things. Things can be defined because 
they can be possessed and operated, but 
it is impossible to possess persons.46 
 
 However, in spite of all the 
insufficiency of science to deal with the 
problem of personhood, persons do not 
disappear but reveal themselves in a 
rather dramatic way. Since humanity as 
personhood is not content with the 
presence of beings in the world as they 
are given to it empirically and studied 
scientifically. As we pointed out in the 
Introduction humanity wants to 
recognise beings not so much according 
to their nature, but as results of free will. 
Thus by subjugating that truth which is 
gained on the grounds of the scientific to 
the desire for truth of the whole created 
existence humanity exhibits its 
hypostatic essence, that is its personhood. 
Humanity as personhood prefers to 
express its own presence by appealing to 
the belief in the trans-worldly source of 
this existence in the conditions of its 
incapacity to overcome the absence of 
                                                
46 (Clément 2000, p. 30). Knowledge of persons 
is possible only through love, so that the 
Cartesian “Cogito ergo sum” must be replaced 
by “amo ergo sum”.  G. Marcel, in a similar vein, 
develops an idea that love of a person precludes 
possession of this person in any possible sense 
(Marcel 1965).  
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personhood in scientific articulations of 
the world. Humanity makes this effort as 
a resistance to being contained by the 
universe and being comprehended in the 
phenomenality of objects. It does not 
want to be manipulated through 
circumscribability and individualisation 
which are inherent in spatio-temporal 
representations of the universe. It is in 
this sense that humanity as personhood 
longs for truth of existence which is in 
this world but not of this world. This 
longing forms spiritual motives of 
humanity and points toward the telos of 
explanation of all, in which the paradox 
the human hypostatic existence as 
presence  in  absence  will have to be 
finally resolved.  
 
 The reinstatement of personhood 
implies that one must turn to the 
foundations of the sciences, their origin 
in constitutive acts of subjectivity. The 
absence of personhood  in the resulting 
scientific picture of the world must be 
subjected to the phenomenological 
scrutiny in order to recover back those 
intentionalities of human subjectivity 
which led to the development of the 
world-view in terms of efficient physical 
causality. We have here a kind of a 
phenomenological reversal in attitude to 
cosmology: to look at it not from the 
point of view of the content of its 
theories and their alleged reference to 
the physical world, not to enquire into 
the meaning of concepts, such as, for 
example,  the universe as a whole, its 
origin etc., but, in fact,  to use 
cosmology as a hermeneutical tool  for 
understanding  humanity itself, to use 
the human image of the universe as a 
kind of mirror through which human 
subjectivity and persons constitute 
themselves. It is through this shift in 
attitude that the sense of cosmology can 
be reversed: it can be seen as that 
activity of the human self, which 
through its outward look establishes 
itself and brings  out (according to its 
will) the absence of personhood in the 
mathematised science to its explicit 
philosophical presence. The 
phenomenological reversal to the noetic 
pole of cosmological research is thus 
dictated by the work of intentionality. 
Seen this way, cosmological research 
exhibits an interesting interplay between 
the elements of the natural and human 
sciences that we discuss below.    
 
The phenomenological reversal  
of  such a construct as the universe as a 
whole (which served for the naturally 
oriented mind as the ultimate objective 
background of all facticity of life), 
reveals this construct  as a certain 
structure of the incarnate transcendental 
subjectivity. If in the natural attitude 
science affirms the explicit presence of 
the universe at the expense of the 
absence of personhood, in the 
philosophical attitude the universe as an 
intentional correlate of human 
subjectivity does not possess qualities of 
“out there” that is not measured in terms 
of distance. It is not the “other” as object 
here or there, above or below, right of 
left, near or far. The universe in all its 
entirety is posed as existent in the human 
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hypostasis, but since this entirety is not 
available to any empirical acquisition, 
this enhypostasisation manifests the 
universe’s presence in absence. This 
result is not surprising, for as human 
personhood escapes complete definitions 
by manifesting itself through “presence 
in absence”, the universe, being a mirror 
of the human reason through which  
humanity constitutes itself  also escapes 
complete definitions thus acquiring a 
mode of  “presence in absence”, that is a 
mode of personal “opposite” of dynamic 
ecstatic reference. When one articulates 
the universe in terms of measurements of 
distance one loses personhood; when 
one brings the universe to being a 
personal “opposite” of ecstatic reference 
one loses the sense of the universe as 
extended space and time. The universe 
can then be understood as a kind of 
otherness  of personhood which is 
present in the event of person’s self-
affirmation.  
 
 The positioning of human beings 
in the universe in terms of extended 
space and time represents a mental 
abstraction from the living experience 
(personal ecstatic reference) as that 
context where human beings conceive 
themselves as unique  forms of  
existence. There is an immediate living 
context common to all human beings 
which makes their life meaningful and 
valuable regardless of what scientific 
books write about human insignificance 
on a cosmic scale. 47   But this living 
                                                
47 The articulation of insignificance of humanity 
in the universe plays a strange role in 
context, the life-world in the 
terminology of Husserl, is not taken into 
account by science (as an ingredient of 
its own constitution). This indicates that 
the scientific picture of the universe,  
and hence its assertions about the 
insignificant place of human beings (as 
physical bodies) in it, represent 
abstractions from the living experience.  
The abstraction of the universe as the 
measurable and extended distance 
manifests the ideal of classical 
rationality to objectify the meaning of 
things (events) by means of paralleling 
the immediate experience of these things 
through their intelligible image in an 
abstract “space”, which contains 
universal structures accessible to every 
consciousness.   
 
 This implies mathematics as a 
language of description, that allows 
everyone to position a physical event (as 
an existential event) in the abstract 
mathematical space and time. Then one 
can realize that the “physical” reality, 
which is  articulated by conscious beings 
in the intelligible world contains in itself 
non-empirical elements, rooted in the 
                                                                 
contributing towards the disappearance of  
existential function of modern science. The 
statement of this insignificance represents some 
scientific truth which is valuable for science 
itself. It does not affect at all a “man from the 
street” who “feels” in some manner that science 
literally “has nothing to say to him”. 
Consequently “man of science is incapable of 
telling him how to live, what is the significance 
of his job, what are those historical events which 
have grave consequence for his life.”  (Strasser 
1967, p. 211). It is in this sense science as 
activity does not affect the life-world as the 
sphere of  existential events in their sheer 
facticity. 
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trans-empirical nature of human  
subjectivity.  This implies that “nature” 
(or the universe), understood classically 
as something which is  independent  
from acts of consciousness  cannot 
function anymore as a logically 
consistent  notion, for it involves human 
consciousness in its definition as 
constitution. This is, in fact, a new 
saying of that which W. Heisenberg  
advocated long ago, namely that the 
natural sciences are created by men, and 
that the function of the sciences is to be 
a part of the interaction, or relationship 
between nature and human beings. 48 
This entails the conclusion that scientific 
reality is not only the realm  of the outer 
world, but also the realm of 
consciousness’s work in scientific 
discourse. Reality becomes a relation, an 
encounter, a coexistence of oneself and 
the world, ordination of the world to one 
and opening  of oneself to the world, at 
once oneself and that which is other than 
oneself. 49  Correspondingly  physical 
theories of the universe can be 
interesting  not only for the sake of 
physics and cosmology per se.  While 
studying  physical nature we also study 
the relationship between us and nature, 
and as a result, we study human nature. 
Cosmology, being initially a natural 
                                                
48 (Heisenberg 1989, p. 69; 1958, p. 24) 
(emphasis added).  
49 (De Waelhens 1957, p. 168). C.f. J. 
A.Wheeler’s ideas on the dialogical character of 
study of the universe, when the resulting picture 
of reality appears as a cumulative result in the 
chain of questions to and responses from that 
which out there (see, for example (Wheeler 1994) 
and bibliography therein). 
  
scientific aspiration towards the whole 
universe, thus becomes the “cosmology” 
of the interior cosmos of the human 
mind. Cosmology becomes a science of 
the human affairs whereas the universe, 
as science portrays it, becomes a 
“mirror” of the human embodied soul, 
the vision of humanity inside out.  By 
paraphrasing a passage from M. 
Merleau-Ponty, one can suggest that  
scientific thinking of the universe, a 
thinking which looks on from above, and 
thinks of the  universe as an object, must 
return to ‘there is’ which precedes it, that 
is to the site, the soil of the humanly 
produced and modified world, as it is in 
our lives and for our  actual bodies 
which we call ours, this sentinel standing 
quietly at the command of our words and 
acts (Merleau-Ponty1993, pp. 122-23). 
The same can be reformulated 
differently. 
 
 Since from a phenomenological 
point of view the structures of the 
disclosure of embodiment are part of the 
same cognitive life that extends to things 
like the categories of thinking, the exact 
sciences, logic and mathematics, the 
very paradox of human subjectivity in 
the universe contributes towards the 
constitution of the person understood as 
a transcendental subjectivity that faces 
its own corporeality through the 
empirical structures of the world. In 
other words, the very constitution of 
corporeality as an intentional correlate of 
consciousness takes place through the 
positioning of conscious bodies in the 
background of all cosmic things. But this 
 30 
implies that cosmology, as a special 
physico-mathematical thematisation of 
this corporeal background, contributes 
indirectly towards the problem of the 
hypostatic corporeality,  that is “to the 
site, the soil of the humanly produced 
and modified world” as that personal 
“opposite” of dynamic ecstatic reference. 
Here we come to a threshold in our 
discussion of the meaning of the human 
dimension in cosmology by formulating 
a thesis that cosmology is such a 
discipline where the demarcation 
between the elements of the natural and 
human sciences becomes very loose: 
cosmology functions at the crossroads  
of the natural  and human sciences. 50
                                                
50 See the detailed discussion of this thesis in my 
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